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The person who is invited to comment upon a symposium en-
joys one obvious advantage over the active participants in the
symposium: their work is before him, he has time to reflect upon
it, and so he is afforded at least the opportunity to discover the
inter-play and the complementariness of the various ideas at issue.
I am aware of this advantage, and shall try to profit from it.
Certainly there is no need to re-state the views that are held
and the suggestions that are advanced by Dean Brown, Dr. Cohen,
and Dr. Hartman. These gentlemen are thoroughly articulate;
further, they are conscious of the presuppositions that are demand-
ed by the positions they respectively defend, and also of the im-
plications of these positions for legal practice. This degree of in-
tellectual self-consciousness greatly facilitates the task of a com-
mentator. Because of it, there is no need for me to search out the
premises on which their arguments are based, the values that
animate these arguments, nor even the crucial problems in which
they culminate. All of these matters are made transparently clear
in their original discussion.
But this is not to say that no difficulties remain. These men
do not hold all of their premises in common; their senses of value
reveal significant differences of emphasis; and they neither ac-
knowledge exactly the same problems to be crucial, nor the same
methods to be the most effective. This is as it must be at the
present stage of inquiry: these men do not see "through a glass,
darkly"; rather, they see clearly through their several glasses to
that which still remains dark. Pushing inquiry forward from their
chosen positions, they clarify many regions of the law-and par-
ticularly of the relation of law to extra-legal factors- that usually
remain obscure. And the light from these various perspectives
comes to a focus upon those human and social considerations that
are at once the source and the destination of positive law.
It seems only proper that I should concentrate my attention
at this point where these papers merge into a single question.
The original symposium has established with strength and preci-
sion the dependence of legal action upon forces and purposes that
are prior to law. It is here shown with great cogency that the
machinery of the law is driven by energies that are themselves
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generated from a general human source; and that codes of law
are directed toward ends that are defined by general human as-
pirations. That is, law is but one of various means by which man
seeks to realize the values he envisages. But, as I have indicated,
some critical uncertainties remain concerning the identification,
and especially the order of precedence, of these extra-legal ener-
gies and ends. I do not pretend to be able to eliminate these un-
certainties. But I cannot conceive my task as other than to indi-
cate them and to try to arrive at a systematic statement of the
matrix of facts and values that gives rise to law. The content of
this symposium, through its diversity and connectedness, challenges
the commentator to develop an integrated theory of the actual
forces and the ideal values that determine the making of law and
the rendering of legal decisions. This is the task to which I shall
address myself.
II
As a background to this enterprise, it will be advisable to
summarize both the common area of agreement and the significant
points of disagreement that emerge from these papers. Since
fruitful differences of opinion depend upon a more fundamental
body of shared belief, I shall start with the latter.
The important basic legal doctrine that is accepted by all of
these men can be stated in the form of three propositions. First:
That, as a matter of fact, considerations of value pervade the actual
administration of law. Second: That, as a matter of ideal, law
should be an instrument for the realization of values. Third: That,
consequently, it is necessary that these values that are operative
in the judicial process should be made explicit, in order that they
themselves may be criticized and corrected, and also in order that
the efficacy of law in implementing them may be weighed. I shall
discuss these propositions in turn, with emphasis on the first.
The fact that the administration of law is influenced by value-
biases can be established by a line of argument that is simple and
direct. Certain standards of value are an inevitable part of the
psychological equipment of any mature human being. The genesis
of such standards is complex: they come partly from social con-
ditioning, partly from deliberate reflection, partly from tempera-
ment, partly from commitment to situations that favor the ad-
vancement of private interests. These standards then function as
motives and purposes in human decisions: they are influential in
determining what an individual will approve, both for himself and
for others. Judges are human beings. Hence, they have standards
and preferences of value. And these enter into the decisions that
they render.
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These values appear in a variety of guises, and they can be
classified readily if somewhat roughly. One can at least discern
these major "types" of value: religious, ethical, social, political,
economic, and aesthetic. Upon matters within these domains, any
judge will inevitably have norms of value; within each of these
contexts, he will hold certain ends to be desirable, certain policies
to be right, certain modes of behavior to be proper.
Of course, the operation of such values within the legal process
is not usually open or obvious. The men who administer this pro-
cess tend to regard it as ultimate and self-sufficient, and so to sub-
ordinate all other considerations to its dictates. This is particularly
the case with judges when rendering the decisions that translate
general legal enactments into particular commands to be enforced.
The legislator obviously has to have some extra-legal reasons for
writing the laws he does; unless- in a possible extreme case that
sometimes seems to be his goal -he intends to deduce all his laws
from some superior code, such as a constitution. And the executor
of these laws deals so directly with individual persons and situa-
tions that the general human element continually impinges upon
him.
The judge is more remote, both from the source of law and
from its destination. It is the apparent isolation of the judge from
these obviously extra-legal factors that encourages the idea that
judicial decisions are merely systematic elucidations of the law
and hence immune to all extraneous considerations, whether of
abstract value or of concrete individuality. That is, the idea grows
that the judge in his decisions does nothing but accept the law and
apply it to the facts. Here, both the law and the facts are regarded
as though they were completely determined and clearly defined
when they are presented to the judge: he has only to bring the
moment case under the applicable statute.
That this is not what actually transpires in the courts is evident
to the most casual examination. And it does not transpire because
the element of value influences the judge's findings both of law
and of fact; and it must be so. The judge can rarely "accept" the
law; he has to interpret it: to decide what it means, what it in-
tends, and what is the range of its applicability. In this necessary
act of interpretation, the judge supposedly puts himself in the
place of the original legislator and so discovers the original inten-
tion and reach of the law. But no man can put himself in another's
place; to a far greater extent, he brings the other to his own place.
So legal decisions reflect the values that the judge holds. Further,
the judge can never "apply" the law to the facts until he has
classified these facts. "Facts" per se are unique: as such, the law
cannot possibly reach them, because law is always and necessarily
[Vol. 12
ROLE OF ETHICAL VALUES
general. The law refers to groups or classes, never to individuals.
So the actual facts with which the judge is confronted have to be
recognized and brought under a type- that is, classified. Is a
particular piece of printed-matter second-class mail? Is a man an
employer within the meaning of the statute? Is a company a public
utility? Decisions depend upon the answers given by judges to
these questions. And these answers in turn depend largely upon
the judges' value standards, which obtrude into the judicial de-
termination of what "kind" of facts the present "facts" are.
The general manner in which values force their way into
the judicial process is essentially simple and direct. Many decisions
are determined by the application of such concepts as "due", "just",
"fair", "reasonable", used in both a substantive and procedural
sense. Again, many decisions are controlled by such terms as
"public policy", "general welfare", "social interests", "individual
rights", "equitable outcome". Each of these terms is thoroughly
teleological - it defines ideal situations which the law should
strive to realize. Further, each of these terms is vague to the
verge of ambiguity: it describes this desirable situation only in gen-
eral, and it is left to the judge to specify it. Finally, the situations
that are stipulated by these terms are often in opposition: if a de-
cision is to promote public policy, it may have to qualify private
rights; and the maintainance of due process may violate the de-
mands of equity.
Consequently, the very nature of these concepts -which are
basic and pervasive in the law - makes it impossible to "apply"
them in any routine manner. Laws and facts cannot be brought
together, and a decision precipitated, until the former have been
interpreted and the latter have been classified. Both of these acts
depend largely upon the relative importance that the judge assigns
to the different interests and purposes that are at issue in the
instant case. The recent history of the "clear and present danger"
doctrine of "constitutional rights" and contempt procedings, and
of the legal status of labor unions, are cases in point. As Dr. Cohen
points out, this assignment of relative degrees of importance is a
matter of value discrimination: "the theory of importance is a
theory of value". Thus, decisions regarding both the interpretation
of law and the classification of facts presuppose the continual op-
eration of norms of value.
Not only is this actually the case, it is proper that it should
be so. For these men are further agreed in their insistence that
it is of the essence of law to be an instrument for the realization
of values. Law is the expression of forces that fashion and use it
purposefully, it is directed toward ends that it does not itself de-
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fine, and it is responsible to superior standards. In sum, law is
subservient to justice.
To the average lawyer, as well as to the layman, this agree-
ment will hardly come as a surprise: it will probably appear as no
more than a recognition of the obvious. Yet this agreement is
really quite significant. For there are powerful movements in
modern social and legal thinking that would strenously deny both
of these points. The Austinian school of analytical jurisprudence
is probably moribund, but much of its central dogma has been
retained and even carried further by contemporary schools. In
the context of the present discussion, the crucial tenet of this
general position is the doctrine that law is devoid of value content
and beyond the reach of value determinants. Legal positivism,
the pure theory of law, most socio-cultural philosophies of law,
the various psycho-physiological analyses of the judical process,
and the movement of descriptive jurisprudence - all of these agree
in treating law in a factitious manner. The law is what it is de-
clared to be by those clothed with legal authority, and the whole
concern of legal philosophy should be to study the various social,
economic, and personal factors that influence the decisions that
are reached. This approach to law is purposefully amoral. It re-
gards all value considerations as subjective and unrealistic, and
maintains that it is impossible to measure law against any super-
ior- much less objective -value standards. It limits itself to
two concerns: first, an understanding of the power-systems that
determine the making of law; second, the ability to predict and
control the course of legal decisions and the effects of these de-
cisions on human behavior. The motives that animate this gen-
eral movement are diverse: the desire to make the law more cer-
tain and definite, the recognition that law is a function of social
conditions, the belated discovery that judges are human beings,
the emphasis on economic forces as legal determinants, the reduc-
tionist fallacy that has swept modern thought, and the laudable
ambition to make law an exact empirical science. Some of these
motives are good and some of them are bad. But they all tend in
the same direction: to remove law from normative considerations
by making it a purely descriptive discipline.
It is therefore interesting and encouraging to find the whole
tenor of this symposium centered in the other direction by its in-
sistence that values actually do and properly should pervade legal
decisions. Agreement on these two points calls forth agreement
on a third: the value patterns that are held by judges, and that
influence legal decisions, are often unconscious, unsystematic, and
even inconsistent. To the extent that this is the case, the judicial
process is made subservient to standards that are uncriticized,
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variant, and incoherent. Hence, it is a task of the first importance
to render explicit the norms of value that are actually operative.
It is only in this way that a society can criticize and correct the
values it accepts, and that legal decisions can be kept sensitive to
the expectations of society.
So much for the important area of legal thought that these
papers exploit in common. We can now turn more briefly to the
divergencies that they exhibit. It is granted by all that the pro-
cesses of law should be governed by certain norms and directed
toward certain ends. The crucial question now arises: What are
the source and the content of the values that should determine
legal decisions? The answer given to this question will control
the direction in which the further development of the law is to be
carried. And to this question these men return different answers.
Dr. Cohen places particular emphasis upon the point that
legal decisions should be relevant to current social ideals. He en-
visages the law as primarily an instrument of public policy. Hence,
the most basic responsibility of the judge is to espouse dominant
social values; for it is only in this manner that he can keep his
decisions sensitive to the interests and aspirations of the people
of his society. It is the controlling tenet of his position that the
law should derive its values chiefly from the moral temper and
the social purposes of the people it serves.
Dean Brown bases his position upon the concept of natural
law. This body of "higher law" is grounded in religious and ethical
principles; it is held to precede, and to be superior to, positive
law; it provides an "externally existent body of ideals" which de-
fines the ends the positive law should serve. It is only to this
higher law that "supreme value" attaches; the relative value of
positive law derives from its success in realizing the purposes con-
tained in the higher law.
Dr. Hartman centers his interpretation around the concept of
a science of axiology. Axiology - the science of values- is en-
visaged as an autonomous discipline, independent of theology,
metaphysics, and ethics; it has its own axioms, from which it de-
rives its body of value-knowledge by strictly logical methods; it
stands to the humanities- including law-as mathematics stands
to the natural sciences. Axiology discovers, defines, and orders
the values that it is proper for man and society to realize. The
content of law is then controlled and judged by its faithfulness to
these value norms.
In closing this phase of my discussion, I must again stress that
these statements do not pretend to be complete accounts of the
doctrines they present. These men are quite comprehensive in
the positions they define: each senses the complexities and the
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tensions that are resident in the law, and so recognizes the dangers
of a simplistic interpretation. But they do have, I think, the dif-
ferent emphases I have described. Each takes some one aspect
of the extra-legal basis of law and makes it central. In sum, they
find the primary ground of law in different places.
What I now propose to suggest is an independent and systemat-
ic analysis of the source and destination of law. I think it is clear
that law is the product of a multiplicity of forces, and that it serves
a multiplicity of values. I shall reach toward a complete and or-
ganized statement of these forces and values. Then, perhaps, each
of the interpretations of law that has at times occupied the atten-
tion of jurisprudence can be seen as a grasp of one facet of the
total situation from which law emerges and of the total problem
that law is called upon to solve. I am here concerned to define in
quite abstract terms the extra-legal matrix that gives rise to posi-
tive law.
III
What is law? The phrasing of this question- like that of all
similar questions, such as What is nature?, What is life?, What is
man?, What is good?- is linguistically simple. This has deceived
men into thinking that the question must have an equally simple
answer. And a variety of such have been proposed: Law is what
the sovereign enunciates; Law is what the judge declares; Law is
the expression of dominant private interests; Law is the objectifi-
cation of the General Will; Law is the reflection of Justice; Law is
custom made explicit. These are but a sample.
It is not my intention to add to this list: I shall not propose
any concise definition of law. As I have indicated, I think that all
such attempts to reduce the law to one controlling characteristic
- to identify the essence of law - obscure more than they disclose:
they exhibit strikingly some one feature of law, but they ignore
other features. Such an approach to the problem must issue in a
Procrustean treatment, because it insists on fitting a complex
factual situation into a simple conceptual schema.
I intend to analyze law in terms of the problem with which it
deals. Instead of asking What is law?, I shall ask Why is law?
And if this latter question seems teleological, and so "un-scientific",
let me say at once that I mean by it only an inquiry into the cir-
cumstances that give rise to law and the solutions that law is in-
tended to yield. That is, I am proposing an inquiry that is func-
tional rather than substantive. The advantage of such a method
is that, by focusing attention on the genesis and the purpose of
law, it should prevent us from making false abstractions. When
law is regarded as something that "is", it yields easily to facile
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simplifications; when law is regarded as something that "does",
it asserts its concreteness and complexity.
As soon as we look at the law from this perspective, a salient
fact emerges: law is continually trying to resolve various tensions.
In doing its work - in performing its function- law is confronted
by different sets of conflicting tendencies; and much of the effort
of law is directed toward effecting a reconciliation of these tenden-
cies. In advancing this as a basic and pervasive feature of law, I
am merely generalizing from a number of recognitions of its spe-
cific occurrence. The literature of jurisprudence is replete with
studies of problems where the law is torn between competing
forces, or is made to choose between competing goals. In fact,
one is justified in saying that every general theory of law, and
every analysis of special legal problems, culminates in a dilemma:
law seems always called upon to meet demands that are contra-
dictory.
The best way to clarify this phenomenon is by citing several
cases of its occurrence. I shall merely list these, with no elabora-
tion: they are sufficiently familiar to carry their own commentary.
1. The effort of law to guarantee both freedom and order.
2. The demand that law provide stability and yet allow for
change.
3. Law as an instrument of both efficiency and justice.
4. Law as both protecting rights and defining duties.
5. Law as mediating between private interests and the general
welfare.
6. Law as determined and law as flexible.
7. Law as defining general demands that are above and blind
to individual cases, and law as always dealing with and
so having to adapt itself to individual cases.
8. Law as protecting the inviolability of human character,
and law as controlling the course of human conduct.
These are among the legal dilemmas that the judge encounters
most frequently in his decisions and the theorist in his explanations.
Thus, when we watch the legal process in operation, the
conclusion is forced upon us that the law, responding to contra-
dictory stresses, strains toward a compromise that can never be
reached. If the law has an essence, it is paradox. This is a con-
clusion with which it is difficult to be content. Yet it is a conclu-
sion that must be acquiesced in. The legal process, like the electric
spark, leaps across a gap between poles that are opposite in sign.
To carry the analogy further, the legal process is generated solely
by the energy resident in these two poles; it harnesses this energy,
and directs it toward the improvement of man's condition; when
the legal process disposes of this energy in a wise and efficient
19511
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
manner, it achieves a high degree of tolerance between these poles
and allows their close juxtaposition. But neither law nor the
electric spark, no matter how much energy they carry off, can
annul the contradictions that give rise to them. Not, at any rate,
until a state of physical and social entropy has been reached.
So we must accept the law as a continual effort to maintain
a compromise between forces and purposes that are ultimately ir-
reconcilable. But this acceptance does not entail that the law
is an "irrational", which can only be described in detail and never
understood in principle. We cannot and need not be content with
a mere listing of the dilemmas the law faces. We suspect a con-
nection between these various situations of tension; we sense that
they are not discrete occurrences, but related manifestations of
the elements with which law deals. And so we are led to search
for the primitive and protean tendencies that compete on various
levels and produce the various tensions that law attempts to re-
solve.
In this search, I am already committed to a method. Law is
a process, not an entity. Like any process, it is a transition from
the past to the future: certain conditions determined its genesis
and control its direction. It is these conditions that we must dis-
cover and analyze. Law is a solution to a problem- an answer
to a question. It is the simplest common-sense that you cannot
understand an answer until you have understood the question to
which it is addressed.
We start with the genesis of law. And our first steps can be
taken quickly and easily. Positive law is a human product. Fur-
ther, positive law is a social product. Finally, positive law had a
beginning in time and has undergone a development. There were
-there still are- societies in which the principles and institu-
tions of positive law are non-existent; there are others in which
they occur in only a rudimentary state. So law must be a phe-
nomenon that was initiated by gradually accumulated changes
in human nature and in the modes of social life. If we can dis-
cover the character of these changes, and particularly of the con-
ditions in which they culminated, we should be at the heart of
the legal process and so able to understand law in terms of its
own inner principles.
To answer the questions of when and why law arises involves
an element of speculation; but there is a respectable mass of his-
torical, anthropological, and even biological evidence to support
this speculation. I do not here have the space to document my
case, nor even to support it in detail. I shall state my argument
quite starkly and directly.
Law makes its appearance as one component in the transition
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of man from primitivism to civilization. In this transition, there
are two primary conditions that generate law. The first of these
is the individuation of persons out of the social group. Probably
the most salient feature that distinguishes civilized from primitive
man is the strong sense of his own personality that the former
has. Primitive man regards himself as closely bound to his group;
as sharing and participating in all of its fortunes; as virtually a
part of it, with no proper standing apart from it: the totemic system
expresses all of this very clearly. This close psychological bond
is both cause and effect of the much emphasized fact that within
primitive society men are highly similar: there are few wide dif-
ferences in education, function, or status; patterns of behavior are
rigorously defined by a system of taboo that has the sanction of
natural law; when men deviate from this - as they inevitably do -
their tendency is to acknowledge guilt and denounce themselves.
In all of these respects, civilized society presents a quite dif-
ferent set of conditions and attitudes. Civilized man has precipi-
tated out of the primitive group; he conceives and pursues his
private ends; he forms intra-social groups based on special and
restricted interests. In short, he asserts himself. In the course of
this change, society ceases to be a monolithic and homogeneous
field; its bonds weaken; it has to accept and adjust wide individual
differences. So society becomes a One and a Many. It maintains
its unity; but this unity is now that of a Whole made up of largely
separate Parts. This is the original condition that brings law into
being. The first basic tension that law must resolve is that between
the social whole and its human parts. Law is most fundamentally
a device for defining and assuring certain patterns of individual
behavior, and for administering a power system that can prevent
social disruption. The evidence indicates that the original tenden-
cy of law - as of religion and morality before it - when it is
confronted with this problem, is to re-absorb the individual within
the group; that is, to reduce men solely to the status of parts, and
so to use law solely as an instrument of social organization and
efficiency. The theoretical overtones of this effort reverberate
quite clearly as late as the Republic of Plato, and they are echoed
in the doctrines of modern totalitarianism; their practical over-
tones, of course, we have always with us.
However, this attempt fails. Man persists in the assertion of his
individuality, and so establishes societies that exhibit great heter-
ogeneity of status and function. And then a second step occurs.
Man transfers his self-assertion from the level of the actual to
the level of the ideal. He not only does in fact enunciate his in-
dividual status and pursue his private interests; he declares that
he is right in doing so, and that society must confirm and promote
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his claim. This act constitutes the proclamation of human dignity.
What is here asserted is the doctrine that the locus of social value
lies in individual men. Man now becomes an end in himself. And
society becomes a Means to this End. Society is still the ultimate
repository of organized human power; but this power is now dedi-
cated to purposes that are supra-social. This condition completes
the genesis of law. Law is now envisaged as a device for defining
and assuring the sanctity of the individual, and for administering
a value system that is based on personal self-realization.
Herewith, law is confronted with a new and far more compli-
cated source of tension. It is asserted as a tenet of the human ideal
that each man is an end in himself; and society is declared to be
a means to the achievement of this ideal. So society is a means
to a plurality of ends. Further, these ends- these individual loci
of value- often assert purposes that are divergent or even con-
tradictory. So society has to qualify its various ends before it
can further them. This second basic tension that law must resolve
is that between society as a single organized means and the plur-
ality of individuals who assert themselves as ends. The simplest
theoretical solution of the problem this poses is to credit every
man's self-estimate, and to treat society- and the law- as the
mere executor of whatever compromise men may strike between
themselves, or can impose on one another. This solution has some-
times been approached in practice, and inevitably it has failed.
Then law is called upon to establish certain limits within which
self-assertion is guaranteed but beyond with it is restrained.
We can now put together the two moments of this analysis,
and arrive at a full statement of the problem that lies at the root
of law. In the first place, law has to mediate between the social
group as a functional whole and the individual men who are its
constituent parts. In the second place, law has to mediate between
a plurality of human beings each of whom is regarded as an end-
in-himself and society as a functional means. In the course of
performing this dual task, law transmutes the elements with which
it works: it transforms society into the State; and it transforms
men into Persons. In each case, the nature of the transformation
is the same: the State and Persons are precisely defined, both sep-
arately and in relation to one another; their powers and limitations,
their rights and duties, are explicitly set forth; and institutions
are established to maintain and modify these defined positions.
The original conditions that give rise to law- the original
demands that law is called upon to meet- can now be brought
out sharply. Law has to create a State that combines the charac-
teristics of a whole and a means. And law has to create Persons
who combine the characteristics of parts and ends. These are the
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basic relations to the maintenance of which law is committed.
And it is at once evident that each of these relations is contradic-
tory. Elsewhere in nature, the relation of whole to parts is always
that of end to means. Whether we consider organisms or mechan-
isms, the parts are subordinate to the whole; purpose and value
adhere in the whole -it is the living creature or the engine that
is the object of concern; their parts have value only as they func-
tion to promote the purposes defined by the whole. Here, the
problem posed by the relation of parts to whole is only one of
organization; the parts are sheer instruments, and the only con-
sideration paid to them is in view of their efficiency in contribut-
ing to the whole. This is how the matter stands with men and
with machines.
But the matter stands otherwise with society: here, the whole
is to its parts as means to ends. This relationship is utterly unique
to the social situation. And it is a tissue of contradictions. How
can the parts of a whole have the status of ends that the whole
must serve? How can a means function as a whole which deter-
mines what ends it is to serve? How can ends have the subservient
position of parts within a whole? How can a single whole serve as a
means to a plurality of different and divergent ends? There
seems to be no logical answer to any of these questions. Yet it is
the function of law to provide answers to all of them.
I have so far stated my argument in a largely empirical and
historical manner. I shall now state it in an abstract manner. The
total situation out of which the law arises, the basic elements with
which law deals, can be schematized in this way:
State as Whole State as Means
Persons as Parts Persons as Ends
It is my argument that this is the matrix from which law emerges.
The function of law is to resolve the tensions that occur among
these elements. Different theories and systems of law result from
placing the major emphasis on different ones of these terms and
on different ones of the tensions that arise among them. Different
conceptions of the role of values in law depend upon different
attempts to find for law a basis outside of this system of tensions,
such that law would have some secure standards in terms of which
to settle the pressures that are exerted on it by each of these terms.
To complete this analysis of law, and especially to clarify the
operation of values on determining law, we must turn attention
from these elements with which the law deals to a consideration
of the relationships that law seeks to establish. But first, I should
like to translate these terms into their political and legal equiva-
lents. That should make them appear more realistically as actual
elements of law and not as mere figments of abstraction. Further,
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it should emphasize the important fact that each of these terms is
continually present in the legal process. I shall identify these ele-
ments only briefly through the basic concepts and doctrines that
express them in our own legal tradition.
The state as whole is recognized and justified in the concept
of Sovereignty; its modes of operation as such are defined through
the doctrines of police power and the public welfare. The state as
means is defined through the concept of the Social Contract; its
role as such is assured through all the machinery of representative
government and limited powers. Persons as ends are proclaimed
through the concept of "free and equal creation"; their precise
status as such is defined through the doctrine of Natural Rights.
The final element, persons as parts, is less easy to identify and
characterize within our tradition; and this is indicative of the
nature of this tradition. But this element is explicitly recognized
in the concepts of civic duties and social responsibility; and it is
implied in the doctrine of the General Will, which speaks for all
and demands the allegiance of each.
This translation of the elements that enter into the matrix of
law should render them more familiar. But for purposes of un-
derstanding law, it is best to return to the elements as schematic-
ally determined. The concepts and doctrines that I have cited are
surcharged with emotion. This makes them more powerful tools
of political life; but it unfits them as tools of intellectual analysis.
Their very familiarity and emotional content leads us to think
that through them we have already solved the problem of law.
But a moment's reflection will dispel this illusion. For these basic
concepts are in a state of constant tension among themselves: their
inter-play raises more problems of legal value than it solves. The
state is the agent of society, and so is Sovereign. But the state is
bound to the terms of the Social Contract. But the state has the
final power to interpret the Social Contract so as to promote the
General Welfare. But the General Welfare is the expression of the
General Will of the people. But the state measures the General
Will against the provisions of the Constitution. But the Constitu-
tion is an instrument of Natural Rights, and these inhere in the
people.
And there is no final term to this dialectic. These concepts
define and hallow the values to which our tradition has dedicated
law. But they do not tell the law how to resolve the tensions that
arise among these values. And they obscure the problem at issue
just because they pretend to solve it once and for all. To clarify
this problem we must return to the more abstract terms and schema
that we derived.
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IV
The general problem of law, as I have already defined it, is
to administer a State that is both whole and means and Persons
who are both ends and parts. The further specification of this
problem demands an analysis of the various relations that arise
between these four terms. There are six of these:
1. State as whole and state as means.
2. Persons as ends and persons as parts.
3. State as whole and persons as parts.
4. Persons as ends and state as means.
5. Persons as ends and state as whole.
6. State as means and persons as parts.
The function of law is to maintain all of these relations. Where
law directs its efforts primarily toward some of them, at the nec-
essary expense of others, the quality of social life suffers. The
difficulties that law encounters in its pursuit of value can be
clarified by a brief consideration of these relations.
The first two relations constitute the basic paradoxes of social
life. The first - State as whole and means- can be characterized
as the paradox of disinterested power. The problem here is to
create an organ of public authority that will have sufficient power
to control all of the private groups within society, and will use this
power sensitively and impartially to promote the interests of
these groups. The state must acknowledge all the private inter-
ests that are urged upon it, yet it cannot honor all of these;
some are accepted and some are rejected; this is inevitable, and
the task of law is to see that the selection is based on sound values.
The second of these relations - Persons as ends and parts - con-
stitutes the paradox of institutionalized individuals. The individ-
ual, regarded as a locus of value, is encouraged in the adventure
of self-realization; but the directions in which he can seek this
must be limited, in his own best interests as well as in those of
society. These limits are roughly defined by religion and morality,
and are inculcated by education. But law frequently has to eval-
uate the estimates that people make of themselves as ends and to
qualify this by reference to their status as parts.
The next two relations, considered separately, pose no seri-
ous problems. That of persons as parts to state as whole is largely
administrative: the state as the agent of the social group insists
upon legal mechanisms that will enable it to act with efficiency.
That of state as means to persons as ends is essentially one of rep-
resentation: persons as the constituents of the social group insist
upon legal mechanisms that will faithfully translate their purposes
into social policy. Considered in conjunction- which is the way
in which they always occur - these relations raise all the diffi-
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culties I have already discussed: a means has to decide upon the
ends it is to serve, so law has to determine the relative value of
competing ends; and ends have to be subordinated as parts of a
whole, so law has to determine the relative value of private interests
and the public interest.
The last two relations are again antithetical; but they expose
quite a new facet of the problem of law. What is here discovered
is the fact that law, being constituted of both ideal and actual ele-
ments, continually seeks the sanctuary of doctrines and standards
that are immune to time and change and yet continually confronts
circumstances that are novel and fluid. The relation of State as
whole and Persons as ends expresses man's striving for a com-
pleted and permanent conception of values. To define this relation
is to lay down a lasting pattern of ethical norms and political prac-
tice. It consecrates standards and purposes that are declared to
be absolute. Law operates on this level through the means of
such documents as Declarations and Constitutions. The relation
of State as means and Persons as parts is a recognition that all
human decisions are imperfect and temporary. It asserts the need
for continual change, because all conditions are temporary and all
purposes relative. And so it demands that the legal process be
alert and sensitive to the flux of events with which it deals. For
obvious reasons, law is reluctant to heed this claim in principle;
but it satisfies it in practice by the doctrine that every case is
unique, and also by the enunciation that it is the spirit of the law,
not the letter, that should control. In this dimension, law is torn
between one tendency toward internal coherence and another
tendency toward external flexibility. The decision as to how to
compromise these always involves a judgment of importance, or
value.
These are the continuing tensions that law must resolve. It
can resolve them only by an appeal to values: that is made clear
in every case. Where does law derive these values?
The answers given to this question by philosophers of law
usually exhibit a common motive: they seek to make these values
independent of the elements with which law deals and separate
from the context within which law operates. The basis for this
motive is apparent: it is felt that law can perform its function of
resolving the tensions of actual social life only if it has a standard
that cannot be distorted by these tensions. Law is to derive its
values from some objective and absolute source that is immutable,
and so immune to pressures from the actual; that is, law is to
have access to the ideal, which it then imposes upon the actual.
The nature and source of these supra-actual values has been de-
fined in various ways: they have been grounded in religion, as by
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Dean Brown; in scientific method operating with ethical axioms,
as by Dr. Hartman; in the moral and social sense of humanity, as
by Dr. Cohen. And other possibilities have also been explored.'
I think it is clear that law derives from and depends upon
all of these extra-legal sources. Law is an instrument that man
uses in the pursuit of all of the values toward which he aspires.
But this insistence that law is oriented toward the ideal, while
sound and necessary in itself, should not blind us to the equally
valid point that law is grounded in the actual. Law envisages a
perfect order, and reaches for a permanent code that can adjust
individual differences with complete justice and no friction. But
law deals with human imperfections, with irreconcilable tensions
that spring from conflicts of interests, and with continually chang-
ing conditions in the physical and social environment. So it is of
the essence of the law to be always torn between the ideal and
the actual, the permanent and the changing, the right and the
necessary, the general principle and the concrete case.
These tensions appear most interestingly in the issues raised
by the case of Oleff v. Hodapp.2 The Ohio Supreme Court decided
the case on the ground that the law covering the point was pre-
cise, that it established actual rights and relations, that it defined
a concrete course of action; and the Court held that it was not
the function of judicial law to upset these actual constancies in
the name of extra-legal principles. From one point of view, as Dr.
Hartman cogently argues, this decision is altogether right. From
another point of view, as Dean Brown and Dr. Cohen insist, it is
altogether wrong. This point is made by Williams, J., in his dis-
senting opinion. He says: "It is always hard to be forced to sacri-
fice the right for the sake of a syllogism"3; and he argues that it
is not here necessary. In a recent case in the Federal Court of
Appeals, the position of Judge Williams is defined with force and
brevity in an opinion by Judge Dobie. The case at issue is gen-
erically similar to that of Oleff v. Hodapp in that it concerned the
question of profit gained by methods that cannot be morally ap-
proved; it is specifically different in that it involves the running
of various sorts of statutes of limitation. The opinion of the court,
as expressed by Dobie, C. J., sums up the question in this manner:
The ancient maxim that no one should profit by his
own conscious wrong is too deeply imbedded in the frame-
work of our law to be set aside by a legislative distinction
between the closely related types of statutes of limitations.
Here the proper approach is not technical and concep-
tualistic. Rather, we think it should be realistic and hu-
1 See in this Volume, IL W. Smith, Science Versus Metaphysics, p. 53.
2 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
3Id at 447, 195 N.E. at 844.
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mane. The spirit, not the letter, should control. Qui haeret
in litteris, haeret in cortice.4
And so it goes, on whatever level and in whatever context
we examine law: for every pro there soon appears a contra. In
explanation of this fact, which lies at the heart of law, I have con-
ducted a long and abstract analysis. But now, I think, the lesson
of this analysis can be made quite simply and concretely. The
crucial problem of law concerns administration rather than con-
tent. Law must derive the latter from extra-legal sources, and it
can never be completely guaranteed: that is, we can never be
certain of our knowledge of the content and precedence of values.
But law largely generates and preserves its procedures out of its
own resources. And it can control these, so as to keep them always
sensitive to both value and fact, both ideal and actual, both the
right and the necessary, both the permanent and the changing
elements of life. As I insisted earlier, the law must be considered
functionally rather than substantially: as a method for settling
questions rather than as a finished answer. This insistence can
now, at the end of my inquiry, be put in more definite terms: law
is less a repository of value standards than a process for rendering
value judgments.
4 Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 178 F. 2d 253 (1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 919 (1950).
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